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作者：Lane, PR
作者单位：Trinity College Dublin; Trinity College Dublin
摘要：This paper addresses the topic of cyclicality in fiscal policy. In particular, we show that the level of cyclicality varies across spending categories and across OECD countries. In line with leading theories of fiscal cyclicality, we show that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are the most likely to run procyclical fiscal policies. Wage government consumption is highlighted as the most important channel by which these variables affect fiscal cyclicality. (C) 2002 Els...
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作者：Le Breton, M; Salanie, F
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; INRAE
摘要：This paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game; it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge. We characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies; we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influe...
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作者：Zhao, JH
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：A major concern with tradable emission permits is that stochastic permit prices may reduce a firm's incentive to invest in abatement capital or technologies relative to other policies such as a fixed emissions charge. However, under efficient permit trading, the permit price uncertainty is caused by abatement cost uncertainties which affect investment under both permit and charge policies. We develop a rational expectations general equilibrium model of permit trading and irreversible abatement...
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作者：de Figueiredo, RJP Jr
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Forty-three of the fifty states of the United States have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions. In this paper, I test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power. Using data from 1865 to 1994, 1 show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future; in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority, they implement institutions...
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作者：Besley, T; Coate, S
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Cornell University
摘要：This paper takes a fresh look at the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. It argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions. When spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives, this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature. Depending on precisely how the legislature behaves, the result ma...
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作者：Helm, C
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：This paper compares endogenous choices of tradable and non-tradable emission allowances by non-cooperative countries. I find that the cost savings of trading do not necessarily lead to less pollution. In particular, environmentally more concerned countries usually choose less allowances if these are tradable, but this may be offset by the choice of more allowances on the side of environmentally less concerned countries. Moreover, if the establishment of a trading system requires the unanimous ...
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作者：Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Exeter
摘要：We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a 'toughest firm principle' holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights re...
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作者：Aronsson, T; Blomquist, S
作者单位：Umea University; Uppsala University
摘要：This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the 'dirty' good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity t...
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作者：Cremer, H; Gahvari, F; Ladoux, N
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper constructs a model with four groups of households who have preferences over labor supply, consumption of polluting (energy related) and non-polluting (non-energy) goods, and emissions. It quantifies the model for the French economy and computes its optimal tax equilibria under nine second-best tax regimes. We find that the redistributive role of environmental taxes requires the polluting goods to be taxed at a rate much below their marginal social damage. These goods may even requir...
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作者：Feld, LP; Matsusaka, JG
作者单位：University of Southern California; Philipps University Marburg; University of St Gallen
摘要：in many Swiss cantons, new government programs must be approved by a referendum of citizens before money can be spent. Referendums seem like a natural way to address citizen-legislator agency problems, yet statistical evidence on how referendums affect spending decisions is almost nonexistent. We estimate regressions for Swiss cantons using panel data from 1980 to 1998 and find that mandatory referendums reduced government spending by 19% for the median canton after controlling for demographic...
