Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Figueiredo, RJP Jr
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00167-6
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 2677-2701
• 关键词: line-item veto; public budget institutions; political economy

摘要

Forty-three of the fifty states of the United States have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions. In this paper, I test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power. Using data from 1865 to 1994, 1 show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future; in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority, they implement institutions such as the item veto which will limit future, liberal legislatures. The results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas. First, by showing how the choice of budgetary institutions is endogenous to the political process, it clarifies that political factors must be considered in addition to social efficiency to understand the adoption of budget institutions. Second, it provides evidence in support of theories that have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily 'insulate' policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power (e.g. Moe, 1989; de Figueiredo, 2002). (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.