Lobbying under political uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Le Breton, M; Salanie, F
• 署名单位: Aix-Marseille Universite; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; INRAE
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00142-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 2589-2610
• 关键词: Lobbying; common agency; adverse selection

摘要

This paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game; it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge. We characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies; we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influence. We also offer some results for the general case, including disjoint necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibria to be efficient. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier B.V.