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作者：Casella, A
作者单位：Columbia University; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Following the rationale for regional redistribution programs described in the official documents of the European Union, this paper studies a simple multicountry model built around two regions: a core and a periphery. Technological spillovers link firms' productivity within each of the two regions, and each country's territory falls partly in the core and partly in the periphery, but the exact shares vary across countries. In line with the official view of the European Union, we find that the e...
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作者：Haimanko, O; Le Breton, M; Weber, S
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Southern Methodist University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession. The country is efficient if its breakup into smaller countries leads to an aggregate utility loss. We show that in an efficient country whose citizens' preferences exhibit a high degree of polarization, a threat of secession cannot be eliminated without inter-regional transfers. We also demonstrate that if majority voting i...
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作者：Wilson, JD; Janeba, E
作者单位：Michigan State University; University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions. In the first stage of the game, the strategy variable for each country is the division of a continuum of public goods between central and regional government provision. In the second stage, the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital. A country's decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exists u...
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作者：Alesina, A; Spolaore, E
作者单位：Harvard University; Tufts University
摘要：This paper studies the relationship between international conflict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and nonpeaceful confrontations are possible. We show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood, benefits, and costs of conflict and war. We also study the role of international law and show how better defined international 'property rights' may lead to country breakup and more numerous local conflicts. (c) 2004 Published b...
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作者：Helsley, RW; Strange, WC
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper specifies and solves a two-stage, game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control. In the first stage of the model, private targets and the government choose levels of policing. In the second stage, criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit. The paper's key results are as follows. First, private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less-protected targets s...
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作者：Boadway, R; Thisse, J; Weber, S
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作者：Arzaghi, M; Henderson, JV
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper models and empirically investigates underlying forces that promote governmental decentralization, or effective federalism, in the world over the last 25 years. A move to a federal system is based on the demand by hinterland regions for local autonomy, which increases with national income growth, greater relative hinterland population, and increasing national population. It is influenced as well by the degree of democratization nationally and locally. Decentralization is measured by ...
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作者：Rubinchik-Pessach, A
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：A conventional justification for government hierarchy in the fiscal federalism literature is based upon asymmetry in policy tools or in information access that is available to different levels of government. This paper demonstrates that even if these asymmetries are eliminated, addition of local (regional) governments to a one-tier central government can be strictly welfare improving. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Jehiel, P; Thisse, JF
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：This paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent states. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority to one of the states through a bidding procedure among the group state members. We identify the following tradeoff. competition among states yields higher transfers to the central authority, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when states negotiate prior to the decision making process. We extend and illustrat...
