Can decentralization be beneficial?

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Rubinchik-Pessach, A
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.11.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1231-1249
• 关键词: Public goods; decentralization

摘要

A conventional justification for government hierarchy in the fiscal federalism literature is based upon asymmetry in policy tools or in information access that is available to different levels of government. This paper demonstrates that even if these asymmetries are eliminated, addition of local (regional) governments to a one-tier central government can be strictly welfare improving. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.