Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Haimanko, O; Le Breton, M; Weber, S
• 署名单位: Southern Methodist University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Southern Methodist University; Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.010
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1277-1303
• 关键词: transfers; polarization; SECESSION; EFFICIENCY; STABILITY; political equilibrium

摘要

We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession. The country is efficient if its breakup into smaller countries leads to an aggregate utility loss. We show that in an efficient country whose citizens' preferences exhibit a high degree of polarization, a threat of secession cannot be eliminated without inter-regional transfers. We also demonstrate that if majority voting is used to determine the redistribution schemes within the country, then a high degree of polarization yields the full-compensation scheme as the unique political equilibrium. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.