-
作者：Fox, Justin; Van Weelden, Richard
作者单位：Yale University; Yale University
摘要：We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the executive's proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to the correct policy to pursue, and both are motivated by the desire to appear competent. A partisan overseer is one who, in addition to seeking to promote her own reputation, cares how her decision will impact the executive's reputatio...
-
作者：Gagliarducci, Stefano; Nannicini, Tommaso; Naticchioni, Paolo
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Bocconi University; University of Cassino
摘要：In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions...
-
作者：Boucher, Vincent; Bramoulle, Yann
作者单位：Laval University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may increase participation. Despite risk aversion, uncertainty may improve welfare. In contrast, when countries try to reduce a global public bad, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts and decrease...
-
作者：Galiani, Sebastian; Schargrodsky, Ernesto
作者单位：Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Secure property rights are considered a key determinant of economic development. The evaluation of the causal effects of property rights, however, is a difficult task as their allocation is typically endogenous. To overcome this identification problem, we exploit a natural experiment in the allocation of land titles. In 1981, squatters occupied a piece of land in a poor suburban area of Buenos Aires. In 1984, a law was passed expropriating the former owners' land to entitle the occupants. Some...
-
作者：Kempf, Hubert; Rota-Graziosi, Gregoire
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Clermont Auvergne (UCA); Paris School of Economics
摘要：In this paper we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions. Following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games, we consider a pre-play stage, where jurisdictions commit themselves to move early or late, i.e. to fix their tax rate at a first or second stage. We highlight that at least one jurisdiction experiments a second-mover advantage. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPEs...
-
作者：Aaberge, Rolf; Bhuller, Manudeep; Langorgen, Audun; Mogstad, Magne
摘要：Despite a broad consensus on the need to take into account the value of public services in distributional analysis, there is little reliable evidence on how inclusion of such non-cash income actually affects poverty and inequality estimates. In particular, the equivalence scales applied to cash income are not necessarily appropriate when including non-cash income, because the receipt of public services is likely to be associated with particular needs. In this paper, we propose a theory-based f...
-
作者：Baunsgaard, Thomas; Keen, Michael
作者单位：International Monetary Fund
摘要：With the public finances of many developing and emerging market countries still heavily dependent on trade tax revenues, further trade liberalization may be hindered unless they are able to develop alternative sources of revenue. Against a background of, and to inform, heightened theoretical controversy as to the appropriate balance between trade and other taxes (not least the VAT), this paper uses panel data for 117 countries over 32 years cleaned for a variety of problems in standard data so...
-
作者：Sarpca, Sinan
作者单位：Koc University
摘要：This paper develops a differentiated products model of school competition that distinguishes among different dimensions that matter in the skill acquisition process. The model predicts that when identical schools compete for students, specialization may arise as a competition strategy. This serves rich students' education goals well. Poorer students, however, may attend schools with specializations that do not cater to their relative strengths. By doing so, these poorer students complement the...
-
作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Masters, William A.; Sheremeta, Roman M.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner-take-all tournament. The proportional-prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages...
-
作者：Ferreira, Fernando
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：The endogeneity of prices has long been recognized as the main identification problem in the estimation of marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the characteristics of a given product. This issue is particularly important in the housing market, since a number of housing and neighborhood features are unobserved by the econometrician. This paper proposes the use of a well defined type of transaction costs-moving costs generated by property tax laws-to deal with this type of omitted variable bia...
