Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cason, Timothy N.; Masters, William A.; Sheremeta, Roman M.
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 604-611
• 关键词: performance pay; tournament; Piece rate; Tournament design; Contest; experiments; risk aversion; feedback; GENDER

摘要

This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner-take-all tournament. The proportional-prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants, without altering the performance of stronger entrants. These findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements, which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.