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作者：Deffains, Bruno; Ythier, Jean Mercier
作者单位：Universite de Lorraine; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; European Business School (EBS) University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Lorraine; Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
摘要：Most organ transplants are from dead donors. National transplant organizations exhibit considerable differences in terms of their donor population rates. Spain's organization is by far the most efficient in this respect. We argue that much of the productivity advantage of Spain's transplant organization proceeds from an efficient organization of the production chain, from organ procurement to transplantation. Transplants from dead donors are analogous to a common resource for the transplant co...
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作者：Harstad, Bard; Eskeland, Gunnar S.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Permit markets are celebrated as a policy instrument since they allow (i) firms to equalize marginal costs through trade and (ii) the regulator to distribute the burden in a politically desirable way. These two concerns, however, may conflict in a dynamic setting. Anticipating the regulator's future desire to give more permits to firms that appear to need them, firms purchase permits to signal their need. This raises the price above marginal costs and the market becomes inefficient. If the soc...
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作者：Guriev, Sergei; Yakovlev, Evgeny; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina
作者单位：New Economic School; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Paris School of Economics
摘要：The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the ...
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作者：Becker, Sascha O.; Egger, Peter H.; von Ehrlich, Maximilian
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Warwick; University of Munich
摘要：The European Union (EU) provides grants to disadvantaged regions of member states to allow them to catch up with the EU average. Under the Objective 1 scheme, NUTS2 regions with a per capita GDP level below 75% of the EU average qualify for structural funds transfers from the central EU budget. This rule gives rise to a regression-discontinuity design that exploits the discrete jump in the probability of EU transfer receipt at the 75% threshold for identification of causal effects of Objective...
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作者：Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：The quality of public management is a recurrent concern in many countries. Calls to attract the economy's best and brightest managers to the public sector abound. This paper studies self-selection into managerial positions in the public and private sector, using a model of a perfectly competitive economy where people differ in managerial ability and in public service motivation. We find that, if demand for public sector output is not too high, the equilibrium return to managerial ability is al...
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作者：McInerney, Melissa
作者单位：William & Mary
摘要：During the 1990s, the state of Ohio contracted out Workers' Compensation (WC) case management, incorporating a large bonus payment intended to reward reduced claim duration. The bonus is essentially a decreasing function of average days away from work, excluding claims longer than 15 months. In response, duration is predicted to decrease for claims with moderate injuries and increase for some severe claims so that claimants will miss more than 15 months of work and be excluded from the calcula...
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作者：D'Amato, Marcello; Galasso, Vincenzo
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Salerno
摘要：In a stochastic two-period OLG model, featuring an aggregate shock to the economy, ex-ante optimality requires intergenerational risk sharing. We compare the level of intergenerational risk sharing chosen by a benevolent government and by an office-seeking politician. In our political system, the transfer of resources across generations is determined as a Markov equilibrium of a probabilistic voting game. Low realized returns on the risky asset induce politicians to compensate the old through ...
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作者：Hodler, Roland; Loertscher, Simon; Rohner, Dominic
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Zurich
摘要：We present a model of (re)elections in which an incumbency advantage arises because the incumbent can manipulate issue salience by choosing inefficient policies in the policy dimension in which he is the stronger candidate. The voters are uncertain about the state of the world and the incumbent's choice of policy. Under complete information they would reelect the incumbent if and only if the state is sufficiently high. Undesirable policy outcomes may be due to either a bad state or the incumbe...
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作者：Park, Albert; Wang, Sangui
作者单位：University of Oxford; Renmin University of China
摘要：We conduct the first systematic evaluation of the world's largest community-based development program China's flagship poverty alleviation program began in 2001 which finances public investments in designated poor villages based on participatory village planning. We use matching methods and a panel household and village data set with national coverage to compare changes from 2001 to 2004 in designated poor villages that began plan investments and in designated poor villages that had yet to beg...
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作者：Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Bologna; IZA Institute Labor Economics; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral work values. Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined...
