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作者：Ashworth, Scott; Shotts, Kenneth W.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Stanford University
摘要：Elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander, i.e., to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest, even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters. Pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn, prior to the election, whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest. This suggests that the media can improve accountability by reporting to voters information about whether ...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Tulane University
摘要：We introduce threshold uncertainty, a la Nitzan and Romano (1990), into a private-values model of voluntary provision of a discrete public good. Players are allowed to make any level of contribution toward funding the good, which is provided if the cost threshold is reached. Otherwise, contributions are refunded. Conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian equilibrium are established. Further restricting the threshold uncertainty to a uniform distribution, we show the equilibriu...
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作者：Brunner, Eric J.; Ross, Stephen L.
作者单位：University of Connecticut; Quinnipiac University
摘要：This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50% and 67 to 55%, respectively. We find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote...
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey; Myers, Caitlin Knowles
作者单位：Middlebury College
摘要：We examine motivations for prosocial behavior using new data on volunteer firefighters that contain a dictator game based measure of altruism, surveyed measures of other behavioral factors, and call records that provide an objective measure of time spent volunteering. Controlling for a variety of other explanations, we find that the decision to volunteer is positively correlated with altruism as well as with concern for social reputation or image. Moreover, by utilizing variation in the presen...
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作者：Tang, Ning; Mitchell, Olivia S.; Mottola, Gary R.; Utkus, Stephen P.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：To evaluate the extent of inefficient behavior in 401(k) pensions, now the dominant form of retirement saving in America, we attribute inefficiencies separately to the employer's menu design versus participant portfolio elections. Results from our analysis of over 1000 plans and a million participants demonstrate that most sponsors offer efficient investment menus, but participants undo this by constructing inefficient portfolios thus reducing their potential retirement wealth by one-fifth. Be...
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作者：Fox, Justin; Van Weelden, Richard
作者单位：Yale University; Yale University
摘要：We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the executive's proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to the correct policy to pursue, and both are motivated by the desire to appear competent. A partisan overseer is one who, in addition to seeking to promote her own reputation, cares how her decision will impact the executive's reputatio...
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作者：Eslava, Marcela
作者单位：Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)
摘要：I study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee, who are appointed by the government. Central bankers balance their desire to protect the Central Bank's reputation against their interest to be reappointed. Committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reducing inflation and insulating policy from government pressures. These gains are only achieved if the turnover rate of committee members is low and the committee is small. The former is associated with a lo...
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作者：Gabriel, Stuart A.; Rosenthal, Stuart S.
作者单位：Syracuse University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：The dramatic government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September, 2008 was motivated in part by a desire to ensure a continued flow of credit to the mortgage market. This study examines a closely related issue: the extent to which GSE activity crowds out mortgage purchases by private secondary market intermediaries. Evidence of substantial crowd out suggests that government support for the GSEs may be less warranted, whereas the absence of crowd out implies that GSE loan purchases e...
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作者：Gagliarducci, Stefano; Nannicini, Tommaso; Naticchioni, Paolo
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Bocconi University; University of Cassino
摘要：In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions...
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作者：Couprie, Helene; Peluso, Eugenio; Trannoy, Alain
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; University of Verona; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：The structure of intra-household allocation is crucial to know whether a transfer from a rich household to a poor one translates into a transfer from a rich individual to a poor one. If rich households are more unequal than poor ones, then a progressive transfer among households reduces intra-household inequality, hence inequality among individuals. More specifically, two conditions have to be satisfied for extending Generalized Lorenz judgments from household level to individual one. The frac...
