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作者：Holmes, Craig
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Diamond and Koszegi [Diamond, P and Koszegi. B (2003), Quasi-Hyperbolic Preferences and Retirement. Journal of Public Economics. 87 1839-1972] have argued that quasi-hyperbolic discounting can cause dynamic inconsistency in planning when to retire as well as in consumption plans This comment shows that in a simple model with such preferences. retirement plans are never time-inconsistent, as these same preferences keep savings too low for individuals to ever be able to afford unplanned early re...
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作者：Angrist, Joshua D.; Chen, Stacey H.; Frandsen, Brigham R.
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：The veterans disability compensation (VDC) program, which provides a monthly stipend to disabled veterans, is the third largest American disability insurance program. Since the late 1990s, VDC growth has been driven primarily by an increase in claims from Vietnam veterans, raising concerns about costs as well as health. We use the draft lottery to study the long-term effects of Vietnam-era military service on health and work in the 2000 Census. We find no evidence that military service affecte...
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作者：Tamura, Yuji
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：We analyze a model of the migrant smuggling market where smugglers differ in the capacity to exploit their clients' labor at the destination. We suggest that destination countries with limited resources may prefer to improve the apprehension of smugglers and their clients at the border rather than inland, although either one of these anti-smuggling measures would reduce migrant exploitation. The reason is twofold. First, even if the resulting improvement in border apprehension alone cannot eli...
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作者：Berggren, Niclas; Jordahl, Henrik; Poutvaara, Panu
作者单位：University of Helsinki; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：We study the role of beauty in politics using candidate photos that figured prominently in electoral campaigns Our investigation is based oil visual assessments of 1929 Finnish political candidates from 10,011 respondents (of which 3708 were Finnish) As Finland has a proportional electoral system, we are able to compare the electoral success of non-incumbent candidates representing the same party An increase in our measure of beauty by one standard deviation is associated with an increase of 2...
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作者：Gupta, Nabanita Datta; Simonsen, Marianne
作者单位：Aarhus University; Aarhus University
摘要：Exploiting a rich panel data child survey merged with administrative records along with a pseudo-experiment generating variation in the take-Lip of preschool across Municipalities. we provide evidence of the effects oil non-cognitive child outcomes of participating in large scale publicly provided universal preschool programs and family day care vis-a-vis home care We find that. compared to home care, being enrolled in preschool at age three does not lead to significant differences In child Ou...
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作者：Propper, Carol; Sutton, Matt; Whitnall, Carolyn; Windmeijer, Frank
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Bristol; Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Manchester; University of Aberdeen
摘要：Performance targets are commonly used in the public sector, despite their well known problems when organisations have multiple objectives and performance is difficult to measure. It is possible that such targets may work where there is considerable consensus that performance needs to be improved. We investigate this possibility by examining the response of the English National Health Service to high profile waiting time targets. We exploit a natural policy experiment between two countries of t...
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作者：Alcalde, Jose; Dahm, Matthias
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat Rovira i Virgili
摘要：We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might Value the prize differently We capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class Of Contest Success functions fulfilling several properties The main properties are anonymity and a condition oil the elasticity of a rent seeker's win probability with respect to her effort We show the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs In this equilibrium complete rent diss...
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作者：Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Bologna; IZA Institute Labor Economics; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral work values. Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined...
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作者：van der Ploeg, Frederick
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam; University of Oxford
摘要：The effects of stochastic oil demand on optimal oil extraction paths and tax, spending and government debt policies are analyzed when the oil demand schedule is linear and preferences quadratic. Without prudence, optimal oil extraction is governed by the Hotelling rule and optimal budgetary policies by the tax and consumption smoothing principle. Volatile oil demand brings forward oil extraction and induces a bigger government surplus. With prudence, the government depletes oil reserves even m...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Pathak, Parag A.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
摘要：Costly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face the same opponents again Understanding when and Why it occurs is important both for the design of economic institutions and for modeling the evolution of cooperation Our experiment shows that subjects will engage in costly Punishment even when it will not be observed until the end of the session, which support...
