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作者：Schwartz, Warren F.; Wickelgren, Abraham L.
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We consider the effect of competitor suits in a model in which an incumbent can take an action that deters the entry of a rival. The option to sue the incumbent can provide a subsidy for entry which can maintain competition even when the incumbent takes this action. Liability for the entrant's lost profits, however, can soften post-entry competition. If the incumbent's action is potentially efficient, taking market structure as given, e.g. it reduces her costs, then competitor suits can genera...
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作者：Loeper, Antoine
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions: all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization. This type of collective choice problem arises when members of a federal system have to coordinate nonbudgetary policies such as laws, regulations, standards, or diplomatic policies. Contrary to the common wisdom, decent...
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作者：Xiao, Erte; Houser, Daniel
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; George Mason University; George Mason University
摘要：We report data from public goods games showing that privately-implemented punishment reduces cooperation in relation to a baseline treatment without punishment. When that same incentive is implemented publicly, however, cooperation is sustained at significantly higher rates than in either the baseline or private punishment treatments. Our design ensures that this increased cooperation is not attributable to shame, differences in information or signaling. Rather, our evidence is that the abilit...
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作者：Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Ruebbelke, Dirk
作者单位：Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3); University of Regensburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Australian National University; Basque Foundation for Science
摘要：If the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium. Using the aggregative game approach developed by Comes and Hartley (2003, 2007), this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular, we show t...
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作者：Mastrobuoni, Giovanni
摘要：In 1995, the Social Security Administration started sending out the annual Social Security Statement. It contains information about the worker's estimated benefits at the ages 62, 65, and 70.1 use this unique natural experiment to analyze the retirement and claiming decision making. First, I find that, despite the previous availability of information, the Statement has a significant impact on workers' knowledge about their benefits. These findings are consistent with a model where workers need...
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作者：Clots-Figueras, Irma
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This paper uses panel data from the 16 larger states in India during the period 1967-2000 to study the effects of female political representation in the State Legislatures on public goods, policy and expenditure. It finds that politicians' gender affects policy, but that their social position, i.e., their caste, should be taken into account as well. Female legislators in seats reserved for lower castes and disadvantaged tribes invest more in health and early education and favor women-friendly ...
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作者：Hoynes, Hilary; Page, Marianne; Stevens, Ann Huff
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The goal of federal food and nutrition programs in the United States is to improve the nutritional well-being and health of low income families. A large body of literature evaluates the extent to which the Supplemental Program for Women Infants and Children (WIC) has accomplished this goal, but most studies have been based on research designs that compare program participants to non-participants. If selection into these programs is non-random then such comparisons will lead to biased estimates...
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作者：van den Berg, Vincent; Verhoef, Erik T.
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：This paper analyses the efficiency and distributional impacts of congestion pricing in Vickrey's (1969) dynamic bottleneck model of congestion, allowing for continuous distributions of values of time and schedule delay. We find that congestion pricing can leave a majority of travellers better off even without returning the toll revenues to them. We also find that the consumer surplus losses or gains from tolling are not strictly monotonic in the value of time, because they also depend on the v...
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作者：Campante, Filipe R.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：I propose a framework in which individual political participation can take two distinct forms, voting and contributing resources to campaigns, in a context in which the negligible impact of any individual's actions on aggregate outcomes is fully recognized by all agents. I then use the framework to reassess the relationship between inequality and redistribution. The model shows that, even though each contribution has a negligible impact, the interaction between contributions and voting leads t...
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作者：Alkire, Sabina; Foster, James
作者单位：George Washington University; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper proposes a new methodology for multidimensional poverty measurement consisting of an identification method rho(k) that extends the traditional intersection and union approaches, and a class of poverty measures M-alpha. Our identification step employs two forms of cutoff: one within each dimension to determine whether a person is deprived in that dimension, and a second across dimensions that identifies the poor by 'counting' the dimensions in which a person is deprived. The aggregat...
