Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Ruebbelke, Dirk
• 署名单位: Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3); University of Regensburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Australian National University; Basque Foundation for Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.12.010
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 639-645
• 关键词: Aggregative games; Matching mechanisms; public goods; Warr neutrality

摘要

If the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium. Using the aggregative game approach developed by Comes and Hartley (2003, 2007), this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular, we show that the distribution of income among the agents is crucial for both the existence of interior matching equilibria and Warr neutrality in the case of matching. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.