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作者：Gibbons, R; Waldman, M
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In previous work, we showed that a model that integrates job assignment, human capital acquisition, and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms. In this article, we extend that model in two ways. First, we incorporate schooling and derive further testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence. Second, and more important, we show that introducing task-specific human capital allows us to produce cohort ...
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作者：Azmat, G; Güell, M; Manning, A
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：In some OECD countries the male and female unemployment rates are very similar but in others (notably the Mediterranean countries) the female unemployment rate is much higher than the male. Explaining these cross-country differences is the subject of this article. We show that, in countries where there is a large gender gap in unemployment rates, there is a gender gap in both flows from employment into unemployment and from unemployment into employment. We conclude that differences in human ca...
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作者：Kvaloy, O; Olsen, TE
作者单位：Universitetet i Stavanger
摘要：The article analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively, joint, relative, and independent performance in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two interacting agents. A main result is that the optimal incentive regime depends crucially on the productivity of the agents. This occurs because agents' productivities affect the principal's temptation to renege on the relational contract. The analysis suggests that we will see a higher frequency of...
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作者：Falk, A; Ichino, A
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We study subjects who were asked to fill letters into envelopes with a remuneration independent of output. In the pair treatment, two subjects worked at the same time in the same room, and peer effects were possible. In the single treatment, subjects worked alone, and peer effects were ruled out. We find evidence of peer effects in the pair treatment because the standard deviations of output are smaller within pairs than between pairs. Moreover, average output is higher in the pair treatment: ...
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作者：Coles, M; Masters, A
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：This article considers optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium matching framework where wages are determined by strategic bargaining. It compares the outcome with the standard Nash bargaining approach, which can be interpreted as union wage bargaining with an insider/outsider distortion. It also shows that a coordinated policy approach, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI optimally, generates a much greater welfare gain than a policy that simply varies UI payments by d...
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作者：Choe, CW
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：I study optimal managerial contracts in two contracting environments. When the investment return is contractible, an optimal contract combines a base salary, golden parachute, and bonus. When the return is not contractible, two types of optimal contracts are studied: a contract with restricted stock and a contract with stock options. These three types of contracts are equivalent: they implement the same outcome and lead to the same expected payoff for the manager, implying that the choice of c...
