Team incentives in relational employment contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kvaloy, O; Olsen, TE
• 署名单位: Universitetet i Stavanger
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/497821
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 139-169
• 关键词: implicit contracts; moral hazard; agents; unemployment; performance; tournaments; FIRMS

摘要

The article analyzes conditions for implementing incentive schemes based on, respectively, joint, relative, and independent performance in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two interacting agents. A main result is that the optimal incentive regime depends crucially on the productivity of the agents. This occurs because agents' productivities affect the principal's temptation to renege on the relational contract. The analysis suggests that we will see a higher frequency of relative performance evaluation - and schemes that lie close to independent performance evaluation - as we move from low-productive to high-productive environments.