Optimal unemployment insurance in a matching equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coles, M; Masters, A
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/497820
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 109-138
• 关键词: business-cycle; search; benefits; MODEL; time

摘要

This article considers optimal unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium matching framework where wages are determined by strategic bargaining. It compares the outcome with the standard Nash bargaining approach, which can be interpreted as union wage bargaining with an insider/outsider distortion. It also shows that a coordinated policy approach, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI optimally, generates a much greater welfare gain than a policy that simply varies UI payments by duration.