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作者:Boucher, Vincent
作者单位:Laval University
摘要:I present a model of conformism in social networks that incorporates both peer effects and self-selection. I show that conformism has positive social value and that social welfare can be bounded by network polarization and connectivity measures. I apply the model to empirical data on high school students' participation in extracurricular activities. I find that the local effect of conformism (i.e. the endogenous peer effect for a fixed network structure) ranges from 7.5% to 45%, depending on t...
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作者:Sallee, James M.; West, Sarah E.; Fan, Wei
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Macalester College
摘要:Debate about the appropriate design of energy policy hinges critically on whether consumers might undervalue energy efficiency, due to myopia or some other manifestation of limited rationality. We contribute to this debate by measuring consumers' willingness to pay for fuel economy using a novel identification strategy and high quality microdata from wholesale used car auctions. We leverage differences in future fuel costs across otherwise identical vehicles that have different current mileage...
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作者:Mazur, Karol
作者单位:European University Institute
摘要:I analyze quantitatively a model of labor search with unemployment insurance (UI), savings, voluntary quits and various labor attachment requirements. In particular, I study welfare consequences of a powerful reform giving UI entitlement to workers quitting their jobs voluntarily in order to search for another one. Results of the model calibrated to the US labor market show that there may be significant welfare gains associated with pursuing a generous entitlement policy for quitters as compar...
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作者:Martorell, Paco; Stange, Kevin; McFarlin, Isaac, Jr.
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要:Public investments in repairs, modernization, and construction of schools cost billions. However, little is known about the nature of school facility investments, whether it actually changes the physical condition of public schools, and the subsequent causal impacts on student achievement. We study the achievement effects of nearly 1400 capital campaigns initiated and financed by local school districts, comparing districts where school capital bonds were either narrowly approved or defeated by...
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作者:Nicklisch, Andreas; Grechenig, Kristoffel; Thoeni, Christian
作者单位:Max Planck Society; University of Lausanne
摘要:We study information conditions under which individuals are willing to delegate their sanctioning power to a central authority. We design a public goods game in which players can move between institutional environments, and we vary the observability of others' contributions. We find that the relative popularity of centralized sanctioning crucially depends on the interaction between the observability of the cooperation of others and the absence of punishment.targeted at cooperative individuals....
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作者:Fack, Gabrielle; Landais, Camille
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Paris School of Economics; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
摘要:In the sufficient statistics approach, the optimal tax rate is usually expressed as a function of tax elasticities that are often endogenous to other policy instruments available to the tax authority, such as the level of information, enforcement, etc. In this paper we provide evidence that both the magnitude and the anatomy of tax elasticities are extremely sensitive to a particular policy instrument: the level of tax enforcement. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in France in 1...
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作者:Koethenbuerger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael
作者单位:Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要:There is ample evidence that internal capital markets incur efficiency costs for multinational enterprises (MNEs). This paper analyzes whether tax avoidance behavior interacts with these costs and how policies of competing governments respond to it. We show that the interaction in itself may lead to profit taxes that are inefficiently high (low), provided the costs are attenuated (magnified) by higher profit taxes. Further, internal efficiency costs might render infrastructure provision ineffi...
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作者:Duquette, Nicolas J.
作者单位:University of Southern California
摘要:This paper estimates the effect of the charitable contribution tax deduction on charities' donation revenue from charities' tax filings. A one percent increase in the tax cost of giving causes charitable receipts to fall by about four percent, an effect three times larger the consensus in the literature. Further analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity in the tax response by subsector: health care and home care are more tax-sensitive than other charities, while higher education and arts are ...
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作者:Kesternich, Martin; Loeschel, Andreas; Roemer, Daniel
作者单位:Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); University of Munster
摘要:In this paper, we investigate both short- and long-term impacts of financial stimuli on public goods provision when contributions are tied to individual harm-related behavior. We conduct a large-scale field experiment to examine voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program during the online purchase of a bus ticket We systematically vary the individual payoff structure by introducing different price rebates (2.5%, 50%, 75%) and corresponding matching grants (1/3: 1 1:1, 3:1). Using d...
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作者:Lefgren, Lars J.; Sims, David P.; Stoddard, Olga B.
作者单位:Brigham Young University
摘要:We conduct an experiment to determine how the correspondence between economic rewards and effort, as opposed to luck, affects subjects' ex post voting over redistribution. We find that a large, statistically significant proportion of both high- and low-payoff voters are willing to vote contrary to their self-interest in favor of groups that exert proportionately more effort. We confirm these results in an additional, distinct sample. We also show that when subjects' own effort is greater than ...