The long-term impact of matching and rebate subsidies when public goods are impure: Field experimental evidence from the carbon offsetting market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kesternich, Martin; Loeschel, Andreas; Roemer, Daniel
• 署名单位: Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); University of Munster
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.01.004
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 70-78
• 关键词: Voluntary carbon offsets; Randomized field experiment; public goods; Rebate subsidy; Matching subsidy

摘要

In this paper, we investigate both short- and long-term impacts of financial stimuli on public goods provision when contributions are tied to individual harm-related behavior. We conduct a large-scale field experiment to examine voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program during the online purchase of a bus ticket We systematically vary the individual payoff structure by introducing different price rebates (2.5%, 50%, 75%) and corresponding matching grants (1/3: 1 1:1, 3:1). Using data on returning customers, we investigate the long-term effects of the different stimuli, both while treatments were in place as well as their persistence for the time after treatment removal. In the first bookings, our results show that all price rebate schemes increase the participation rate in the offsetting program, while we find weaker effects for matching grants. When bookers are treated repeatedly, only the equal (1:1) matching scheme continues to lead to higher participation rates. Even after removing the subsidies, we report higher participation rates for customers previously facing a 1:1 matching scheme. This treatment is also the only one increasing net contributions of customers compared to the control group. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.