作者：KIM, J
摘要：I develop a two-period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer's expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium. I find that both expectations (duopoly and monopoly) are fulfilled in the (incumbent's) price-setting game, while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity-setting game. I also find that ''quantity'' is more entry-deterring than ''price'' in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in ...
作者：FRIEDMAN, JW; THISSE, JF
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Sorbonne Universite
摘要：We investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning of time; once chosen, the locations are fixed forever, but the firms will choose prices in each of a countably infinite succession of time periods. We are interested in equilibrium behavior when the firms will collusively arrange a trigger strategy equilibrium in prices, and will select their locations knowing that a particular such trigger strategy price equilibrium will ensue. Specifically, w...
