FULFILLED EXPECTATIONS OF ENTRY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: KIM, J
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2555753
• 发表日期: 1993
• 页码: 681-695
• 关键词: product differentiation; deterrence; COMPETITION; INVESTMENT; duopoly; MODEL

摘要

I develop a two-period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer's expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium. I find that both expectations (duopoly and monopoly) are fulfilled in the (incumbent's) price-setting game, while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity-setting game. I also find that ''quantity'' is more entry-deterring than ''price'' in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in the price-setting game is higher than or equal to that of the quantity-setting game.