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作者：CHOU, C; SHY, O
摘要：In this article we demonstrate how a long duration of patents affects investment in new product development. We construct an overlapping-generations model of saving, investment, and product innovation and show that a long duration of patents results in a high aggregate value of monopoly firms that compete for the younger generation's savings with investment in new product development. We analyze the crowding-out effects of long duration of patents and their implications for individuals' welfar...
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作者：KIM, J
摘要：I develop a two-period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer's expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium. I find that both expectations (duopoly and monopoly) are fulfilled in the (incumbent's) price-setting game, while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity-setting game. I also find that ''quantity'' is more entry-deterring than ''price'' in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in ...
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作者：BIGLAISER, G
摘要：I show that a middleman can be welfare improving in all equilibria in a quite general bargaining model when adverse selection is present. Conditions are determined for when a middleman is most likely to be in a market. Examples of the theory are also provided.
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作者：FRIEDMAN, JW; THISSE, JF
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Sorbonne Universite
摘要：We investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning of time; once chosen, the locations are fixed forever, but the firms will choose prices in each of a countably infinite succession of time periods. We are interested in equilibrium behavior when the firms will collusively arrange a trigger strategy equilibrium in prices, and will select their locations knowing that a particular such trigger strategy price equilibrium will ensue. Specifically, w...
