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作者：Spiegel, Y; Spulber, DF
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The regulated firm's choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives: the firm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases, When the firm's investment is large, countervailing incentives lead both high- and low-cost firms to choose the same capital structure in equilibrium, thus decoupling capital structure from private information, When investment is small or medium-sized, ...
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作者：Branco, F
作者单位：Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：Procurement auctions usually require the bid to specify several characteristics of the contract to be fulfilled. In this article I study the design of such mechanisms, allowing for a special case of correlation on the firm's costs. I describe the properties of optimal mechanisms and study the design of multidimensional auctions. Contrary to the independent-costs model, to implement the optimal outcome the procurer will need to use a two-stage auction: in the first stage the procurer selects on...
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作者：Kim, JH
摘要：The literature on excess entry shows that the free-entry equilibrium number of firms may be greater than is socially optimal, and proposes government entry regulation as a remedy, This article tries to show that such a policy recommendation is misleading. A two-period, three-person entry game model, which explicitly includes second-best government, shows that entry regulation aimed at preventing excess entry actually induces the incumbent to behave strategically against the government and make...
