1997

最新文章

• An empirical exploration of a technology race AI翻译
  作者：Lerner, J
  摘要：An extensive theoretical literature examines technological competition, and in particular whether leaders maintain their standing. These models, however, have received little empirical support. I examine innovation in the disk drive industry, an environment particularly conducive to identifying racing behavior Strategic variables prove significant in explaining the decision to innovate. The patterns are in accord with Reinganum's work: firms that trail the leader innovate more. I add controls ...
• Capital structure with countervailing incentives AI翻译
  作者：Spiegel, Y; Spulber, DF
  作者单位：Northwestern University
  摘要：The regulated firm's choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives: the firm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases, When the firm's investment is large, countervailing incentives lead both high- and low-cost firms to choose the same capital structure in equilibrium, thus decoupling capital structure from private information, When investment is small or medium-sized, ...
• Common agency with horizontally differentiated principals AI翻译
  作者：Mezzetti, C
  摘要：I analyze a common agency relationship where the agent has private information about the difference in his value for two principals. When the principals independently offer incentive contracts, the agent specializes less than is socially efficient, but more than when they cooperate and choose the contract that maximizes their joint payoff Under both arrangements the agent faces countervailing incentives. The pooling region of types receiving a flat fee is larger and the incentive pay of the re...
• One smart agent AI翻译
  作者：Sutton, J
  作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
  摘要：I propose an equilibrium concept for a class of games in which players make irreversible costly decisions; these games have been widely used in the recent Industrial Organization literature. The equilibrium concept is defined not in the space of strategies, but in the space of (observable) outcomes. It is weaker than perfect Nash equilibrium, and it involves combining a form of survivor principle with an assumption about entry. This assumption involves only a very weak rationality requirement:...
• The design of multidimensional auctions AI翻译
  作者：Branco, F
  作者单位：Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
  摘要：Procurement auctions usually require the bid to specify several characteristics of the contract to be fulfilled. In this article I study the design of such mechanisms, allowing for a special case of correlation on the firm's costs. I describe the properties of optimal mechanisms and study the design of multidimensional auctions. Contrary to the independent-costs model, to implement the optimal outcome the procurer will need to use a two-stage auction: in the first stage the procurer selects on...
• Inefficiency of subgame optimal entry regulation AI翻译
  作者：Kim, JH
  摘要：The literature on excess entry shows that the free-entry equilibrium number of firms may be greater than is socially optimal, and proposes government entry regulation as a remedy, This article tries to show that such a policy recommendation is misleading. A two-period, three-person entry game model, which explicitly includes second-best government, shows that entry regulation aimed at preventing excess entry actually induces the incumbent to behave strategically against the government and make...