作者：Conlin, M
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I empirically test for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining context of National Football League (NFL) contract negotiations. The separating equilibrium predicts that a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has positive private information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations. These predictions are tested using data on 1,873 players selected in the 1986 through 1991 NFL drafts. The empirical results support the implications of the...
作者：Scotchmer, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The patent system is mainly a renewal system: the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees. I ask whether such a system cart be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research. In such a model I show that renewal mechanisms (possibly with subsidies) are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on, regardless of the objective function. Under plausible circumstances, patents should have a uniform life, rather than varying i...
