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作者：Conlin, M
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I empirically test for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining context of National Football League (NFL) contract negotiations. The separating equilibrium predicts that a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has positive private information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations. These predictions are tested using data on 1,873 players selected in the 1986 through 1991 NFL drafts. The empirical results support the implications of the...
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作者：Scotchmer, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The patent system is mainly a renewal system: the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees. I ask whether such a system cart be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research. In such a model I show that renewal mechanisms (possibly with subsidies) are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on, regardless of the objective function. Under plausible circumstances, patents should have a uniform life, rather than varying i...
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作者：Lamont, O; Stein, JC
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We use city-level data to analyze the relationship between homeowner borrowing patterns and house-price dynamics. Our principal finding is that in cities were a greater fraction of homeowners are highly leveraged-i.e., have high loan-to-value ratios-house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as changes in per-capita income. This finding is consistent with recent theories that emphasize the role of borrowing in shaping the behavior of asset prices.
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作者：Götz, G
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：This article analyzes the adoption and diffusion of new technology in a market for a differentiated product with monopolistic competition, I show that in a noncooperative equilibrium ex ante identical firms adopt a new technology at different dates. This equilibrium can be described by a simple distribution function. For nonidentical firms, I state the conditions under which a positive relationship between firm size and speed of adoption exists. The model integrates rank and stock effects, I d...
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作者：Anderson, SP; Renault, R
作者单位：University of Virginia; Universite de Caen Normandie
摘要：We study price competition in the presence of search costs and product differentiation. The limit cases of the model are the Bertrand Paradox, the Diamond Paradox, and Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. Market prices rise with search costs and decrease with the number of firms. Prices may initially fall with the degree of product differentiation because more diversity leads to more search and hence more competition. Equilibrium diversity rises with search costs, while the optimum level fa...
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作者：Boyer, M; Laffont, JJ
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Polytechnique Montreal; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This article makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preference for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. We recast the question. of instrument choice in the general mechanism design literature within art incomplete contract approach to political economy. We show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a standard economic vie...
