Toward a political theory of the emergence of environmental incentive regulation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boyer, M; Laffont, JJ
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Polytechnique Montreal; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2556050
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 137-157
• 关键词: instrument choice; POLICY; ECONOMY; COSTS; risks

摘要

This article makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preference for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. We recast the question. of instrument choice in the general mechanism design literature within art incomplete contract approach to political economy. We show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a standard economic viewpoint Their justification lies in the limitations they impose on the politicians' ability to distribute rents. Insights are provided on the emergence of incentive mechanisms in environmental regulation.