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作者：Gutiérrez, M
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：I present a principal-agent model where the shareholders (principal) can take legal action against the director (agent). The court's decision provides a verifiable but costly and imperfect signal on the director's fulfilment of his fiduciary duties. The director's remuneration can be made contingent not only on performance but also upon the court's decision. 1 show that when damage awards are high enough, the widespread use of liability insurance and limited-liability provisions that is observ...
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作者：Levin, D; Peck, J
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We consider a simultaneous-move, dynamic-entry game. The fixed cost of entry is private information. Entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry. We consider general continuous distributions,for the fixed cost, and we characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in pure strategies. Comparative-statics results are derived. As the time between rounds approaches zero, all of the acti...
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作者：Faure-Grimaud, A; Martimort, D
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse
摘要：Regulatory independence from political control enlarges the collusive opportunities between regulators and interest groups. This is costly for current politicians because deterring capture becomes harder. However, independence also constrains future governments. Whenever future and current governments have different preferences, independence creates a stabilization effect as both majorities find it more difficult to move policies toward their ideal points. Since deterring collusion links curre...
