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作者：Hall, BH; Jaffe, A; Trajtenberg, M
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Brandeis University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We explore the usefulness of patent citations as a measure of the importance of a firm's patents, as indicated by the stock market valuation of the firm's intangible stock of knowledge. Using patents and citations for 1963-1995, we estimate Tobin's q equations on the ratios of R&D to assets stocks, patents to R&D, and citations to patents. We find that each ratio significantly affects market value, with an extra citation per patent boosting market value by 3%. Further findings indicate that un...
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作者：Cestone, G; Fumagalli, C
作者单位：University of Salerno; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets, resources may be channelled to either more- or less-profitable units. Depending on the amount of internal resources, a group may exit a market in response to increased competition, or channel funds to the subsidiary operating in that market. This has important implications for the strategic impact of group membership. Affiliation to a monopolistic subsidiary can make a cash-rich (poor) firm more (less) vulnerable to entry...
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作者：Chen, KP; Chu, CYC
作者单位：National Taiwan University
摘要：We offer a formal model of corporate income tax evasion. While individual tax evasion is essentially a portfolio-selection problem, corporate income tax evasion is much more complicated. When the owner of a firm decides to evade taxes, not only does she risk being detected by the tax authorities, more importantly, the optimal compensation scheme offered to the employees will also be altered. Specifically, due to the illegal nature of tax evasion, the contract offered to the manager is necessar...
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作者：Lafontaine, F; Shaw, KL
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Franchisors simultaneously operate outlets under two distinct incentive schemes: franchising and company ownership. Using an extensive panel dataset, we show that experienced franchisors maintain a stable level of corporate ownership over time. However, the targeted rate of company ownership varies considerably across firms. We show that franchisors with high brand name value, measured by major media expenditures and other proxies, have high rates of company ownership. We argue that franchisor...
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作者：Shavell, S
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Minimum asset and liability insurance requirements must often be met in order for parties to participate in potentially harmful activities. Such financial responsibility requirements may improve parties' decisions whether to engage in harmful activities and, if so, their efforts to reduce risk. However, the requirements may undesirably prevent some parties with low assets from engaging in activities. Liability insurance requirements tend to improve incentives to reduce risk when insurers can o...
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作者：Compte, O; Lambert-Mogiliansky, A; Verdier, T
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：We investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e., the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide an opportunity for bid readjusments in exchange for a bribe. As firms expect to be paying a bribe, a mechanical effect of corruption is to increase the contract price by an amount corresponding to the anticipated bribe. We show, however, that a key effect of corruption is to facilitate collusion in price between firm...
