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作者：Hiriart, Yolande; Martimort, David
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：We characterize the optimal regulation of a firm that undertakes an environmentally risky activity. This firm (the agent) is protected by limited liability and bound by contract to a stakeholder (the principal). The level of safety care exerted by the agent is nonobservable. This level of care depends both on the degree of incompleteness of the regulatory contract and on the allocation of bargaining power between the principal and the agent. Increasing the wealth of the principal that can be s...
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作者：Johnson, Justin P.; Myatt, David P.
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Oxford
摘要：We study a Cournot industry in which each firm sells multiple quality-differentiated products. We use an upgrades approach, working not with the actual products but instead with upgrades from one quality to the next. The properties of single-product models carry over to the supply of upgrades, but not necessarily to the supply of complete products. Product line determinants and welfare results are presented. Strategic commitment to product lines is considered; firms may well choose to compete ...
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作者：Dai, Chifeng; Lewis, Tracy R.; Lopomo, Giuseppe
作者单位：Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University; Duke University
摘要：Owners of property and assets frequently delegate decisions about operating and maintaining their property to managers who are better informed about local market conditions. We analyze how owners optimally contract with managers who vary in their expertise at prescribing service. We show that the most expert managers offer the greatest variation in operating recommendations. Owners benefit from dealing with experts provided they contract sequentially, whereby terms are negotiated gradually as ...
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作者：Rochet, Jean-Charles; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We provide a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and present new results. We identify two-sided markets with markets in which the structure, and not only the level of prices charged by platforms, matters. The failure of the Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two-sidedness. We build a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality, and obtain new resul...
