Delegating management to experts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dai, Chifeng; Lewis, Tracy R.; Lopomo, Giuseppe
• 署名单位: Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University; Duke University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00028.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 503-520
• 关键词: liquidated damage clauses; INFORMATION; ECONOMICS; optimality; CONTRACTS; auctions; SYSTEM; MODEL

摘要

Owners of property and assets frequently delegate decisions about operating and maintaining their property to managers who are better informed about local market conditions. We analyze how owners optimally contract with managers who vary in their expertise at prescribing service. We show that the most expert managers offer the greatest variation in operating recommendations. Owners benefit from dealing with experts provided they contract sequentially, whereby terms are negotiated gradually as the manager acquires information.