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作者：Harrington, Joseph E., Jr.; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Stanford University
摘要：Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored whenfirms' prices are private information and their quantities are public information; such an information structure is consistent with several recent price-fixing cartels, such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric oligopoly games, it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion. An asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quo...
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作者：Dal Bo, Pedro
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Previous literature has shown that demand fluctuations affect the scope for tacit collusion. I study whether discount factor fluctuations can have similar effects. I find that collusion depends not only on the level of the discount factor but also, and more surprisingly, on its volatility. Collusive prices and profits increase with a higher discount factor level, but decrease with its volatility. These results have important implications for empirical studies of collusive pricing, the role tha...
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作者：Dutta, Prajit; Matros, Alexander; Weibull, Joergen W.
作者单位：Columbia University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We generalize the standard repeated-games model of dynamic oligopolistic competition to allow for consumers who are long-lived and forward looking. Each period leaves some residual demand to future periods and pricing in one period affects consumers' expectations about future prices. We analyze this setting for an indivisible durable good with price-setting firms and overlapping cohorts of consumers. The model nests the repeated-game model and the Coasian durable-goods model as its two extreme...
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作者：Esteban, Susanna; Shum, Matthew
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We study the effects of durability and secondary markets on equilibrium firm behavior in the car market. We construct a dynamic oligopoly model of a differentiated product market to incorporate the equilibrium production dynamics that arise from the durability of the goods and their active trade in secondary markets. We derive an econometric model and estimate its parameters using data from the automobile industry over a 20-year period. Our estimates are used to provide a measure of the compet...
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作者：Aarland, Kristin; Davis, James C.; Henderson, J. Vernon; Ono, Yukako
作者单位：Brown University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：A firm's production activities are often supported by nonproduction activities, such as administrative units including headquarters, which process information both within and between firms. Firms may physically separate such administrative units from their production activities and create stand-alone central administrative offices (CAOs). However, activities in multiple locations may cause internal communication costs. What types of firms are more likely to separate such functions? If firms se...
