Long-run price competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dutta, Prajit; Matros, Alexander; Weibull, Joergen W.
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00069.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 291-313
• 关键词: dynamic oligopoly; monopoly; collusion; cycles

摘要

We generalize the standard repeated-games model of dynamic oligopolistic competition to allow for consumers who are long-lived and forward looking. Each period leaves some residual demand to future periods and pricing in one period affects consumers' expectations about future prices. We analyze this setting for an indivisible durable good with price-setting firms and overlapping cohorts of consumers. The model nests the repeated-game model and the Coasian durable-goods model as its two extreme cases. The analysis is mostly focused on constant-price collusion but conditions for collusive recurrent sales are also identified.