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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：Firms communicate product quality to consumers through a variety of channels. Economic models of such communication take two alternative forms when quality is exogenous: (i) disclosure of quality through a credible direct claim; or (ii) signalling of quality via producer actions that influence buyers' beliefs about quality. In general, these two literatures have ignored one another. We argue that firms should be viewed as choosing which means of communication they will employ. We show that int...
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作者：Raith, Michael
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I examine optimal incentives and performance measurement in a model where an agent has specific knowledge (in the sense of Jensen and Meckling) about the consequences of his actions for the principal. Contracts can be based both on input measures related to the agent's actions and an output measure related to the principal's payoff. Whereas input-based pay minimizes income risk, only output-based pay encourages the agent to use his knowledge efficiently. In general, it is optimal to use both k...
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作者：Biais, Bruno; Perotti, Enrico
作者单位：Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); University of Amsterdam
摘要：We study how early-stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses. Even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension, such as technical feasibility, correspondence to market demand, legality, or patentability. To screen good ideas, the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise. Sharing the idea, however, creates the risk that the expert would steal it. Yet, the idea-thief cannot contact any other expert, lest he sho...
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作者：Caruana, Guillermo; Einav, Liran
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze a dynamic model of quantity competition, where firms continuously adjust their quantity targets, but incur convex adjustment costs when they do so. Quantity targets serve as a partial commitment device and, in equilibrium, follow a hump-shaped pattern. The final equilibrium is more competitive than in the static analog. We then use data on monthly production targets of the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers and show a similar empirical hump-shaped dynamic pattern. Taken together, thi...
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Riordan, Michael H.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Columbia University
摘要：In a discrete choice model of product differentiation, the symmetric duopoly price may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the single-product monopoly price. Whereas the market share effect encourages a duopolist to charge less than the monopoly price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers, the price sensitivity effect motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the firm's demand curve. The joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products determine...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：Columbia University; Harvard University
摘要：A liquidity-constrained entrepreneur raises capital to finance a business activity that may harm bystanders. The entrepreneur raises senior (secured) debt to shield assets from the tort victims in bankruptcy. For a fixed level of borrowing, senior debt creates better incentives for precaution taking than either junior debt or outside equity. The entrepreneur's level of borrowing is, however, socially excessive. Giving tort victims priority over senior debtholders in bankruptcy prevents overlev...
