Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00046.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 973-989
• 关键词: advertising signals; product; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; warranties; price; certification; continuum; liability; MARKETS

摘要

Firms communicate product quality to consumers through a variety of channels. Economic models of such communication take two alternative forms when quality is exogenous: (i) disclosure of quality through a credible direct claim; or (ii) signalling of quality via producer actions that influence buyers' beliefs about quality. In general, these two literatures have ignored one another. We argue that firms should be viewed as choosing which means of communication they will employ. We show that integration of these two alternatives leads to new implications about disclosure, signalling, firm preferences over type, and the social efficiency of the channel of communication employed.