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作者：Poblete, Joaquin; Spulber, Daniel
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Northwestern University
摘要：The analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability. We introduce a critical ratio that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state. The form of the contract is debt (a capped bonus) when the critical ratio is increasing (decreasing) in the state. An increasing critical ratio in the state-space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced-form d...
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作者：Farias, Vivek; Saure, Denis; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Columbia University
摘要：In this article, we introduce a new method to approximate Markov perfect equilibrium in large-scale Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic oligopoly models that are not amenable to exact solution due to the curse of dimensionality. The method is based on an algorithm that iterates an approximate best response operator using an approximate dynamic programming approach. The method, based on mathematical programming, approximates the value function with a linear combination of basis functions. We...
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作者：Farrell, Joseph; Simcoe, Timothy
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Consensus standardization often involves bargaining without side payments or substantive compromise, creating a war of attrition that selects through delay. We investigate the trade-off between screening and delay when this process selects for socially valuable but privately observed quality. Immediate random choice may outperform the war of attrition, or vice versa. Allowing an uninformed neutral player to break deadlocks can improve on both mechanisms. Policies that reduce players vested int...
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作者：Toth, Aron
作者单位：University of Bath
摘要：Industry dynamics are studied as an endogenous tournament with infinite horizon and stochastic entry. In each period, firms investments determine their probability of surviving into the next period. This generates a survival contest, which fuels market structure dynamics, while the evolution of market structure constantly redefines the contest. More concentrated markets endogenously generate less profit, rivals that are more difficult to outlive, and more entry. The unique steady-state distrib...
