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作者：Parrotta, Pierpaolo; Pozzoli, Dario
作者单位：Aarhus University; University of Lausanne
摘要：This article focuses on the phenomenon of interfirm labor mobility as a potential channel for knowledge transfer. Using data from the Danish employer-employee register covering the period 19952005, we investigate how knowledge carrierstechnicians and highly educated workers recruited from a donor firmcontribute to knowledge diffusion and enhanced productivity in the hiring (recipient) firm. Structural estimation of the hiring firms' production functions shows that the impact of the recruitment...
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作者：Carvell, Daniel; Currie, Janet; MacLeod, W. Bentley
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：Most U.S. states have enacted JSL reform, the move from a regime of joint and several liability (JSL) that allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from any one of multiple defendants to one where defendants are held liable only for the harm they cause. Contrary to previous theoretical work, we show that JSL reform can increase precaution by judgment proof agent by giving deep pockets an incentive to reduce their own liability by bringing judgment-proof agents into court. This result can help ...
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作者：Filson, Darren
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College
摘要：I introduce a computable dynamic equilibrium model of the pharmaceutical industry, parameterize it using industry facts, and use it to predict what happens if the United States adopts price controls or one or more non-U.S. countries abandon their controls. The model generates implications for firm value, research and development (R&D), the flow of new drugs, and consumer welfare. I highlight the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about R&D costs, market size, technological o...
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作者：Rojas, Christian
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Motivated by the Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) models, we construct lab experiments to test the effects of two factors on collusion: information (regarding next period's demand state) and monitoring (of a rival's past action). Results indicate that information may facilitate collusion more than monitoring, especially as subjects gain experience. A robust finding is that subjects in the Rotemberg and Saloner treatment cooperate as predicted by this theory: collusion f...
