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作者：Ellickson, Paul B.; Houghton, Stephanie; Timmins, Christopher
作者单位：University of Rochester; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We measure the effects of chain economies, business stealing, and heterogeneous firms' comparative advantages in the discount retail industry. Traditional entry models are ill suited for this high-dimensional problem of strategic interaction. Building upon recently developed profit inequality techniques, our model admits any number of potential rivals and stores per location, an endogenous distribution network, and unobserved (to the econometrician) location attributes that may cause firms to ...
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作者：Einav, Liran; Jenkins, Mark; Levin, Jonathan
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study the adoption of automated credit scoring at a large auto finance company and the changes it enabled in lending practices. Credit scoring appears to have increased profits by roughly a thousand dollars per loan. We identify two distinct benefits of risk classification: the ability to screen high-risk borrowers and the ability to target more generous loans to lower-risk borrowers. We show that these had effects of similar magnitude. We also document that credit scoring compressed profit...
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作者：Schuett, Florian
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：Patent examination is a problem of moral hazard followed by adverse selection: examiners must have incentives to exert effort, but also to truthfully reveal the evidence they find. I develop a theoretical model to study the design of incentives for examiners. The model can explain the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the U.S. patent office, where examiners are essentially rewarded for granting patents, as well as the variation in compensation schemes and patent quality across patent offi...
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作者：Galasso, Alberto; Schankerman, Mark; Serrano, Carlos J.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study how the market for innovation affects enforcement of patent rights. We show that patent transactions arising from comparative advantages in commercialization increase litigation, but trades driven by advantages in patent enforcement reduce it. Using data on trade and litigation of individually owned patents in the United States, we exploit variation in capital gains tax rates across states as an instrument to identify the causal effect of trade on litigation. We find that taxes strong...
