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作者：Hoernig, Steffen; Inderst, Roman; Valletti, Tommaso
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Goethe University Frankfurt; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with nonuniform calling patterns, accounting for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of similar people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns. Contrary to previous predictions, jointly profit-maximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition if calling patt...
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作者：Starc, Amanda
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This article examines the welfare impact of imperfect competition in the Medicare supplement insurance (Medigap) market. Two firms control nearly three fourths of the Medigap market, and premiums exceed claims by over 25%. I find that a low price elasticity and consumers' brand preferences lead firms to engage in substantial marketing and price above cost. Therefore, the strategic behavior of insurers facing relatively inelastic demand is critical in explaining poor market performance. I also ...
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作者：Chen, Zhijun; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：University of Auckland; University of Rochester; University of East Anglia
摘要：We consider a class of contracts in which buyers commit to giving a seller some minimum share of their total purchases. We show that such contracts can be used by an incumbent seller to reduce the probability of entry by a rival seller when the incumbent can commit to its selling price as part of the contract. We further show that such contracts can be profitable for the incumbent even when exclusive dealing would not be, and even when buyers can coordinate their accept-or-reject decisions. Th...
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作者：Peterson, Jonathan R.; Schneider, Henry S.
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Cornell University
摘要：We analyze adverse selection in the used-car market using a new approach that considers a car as an assemblage of parts, some with symmetric information and others with asymmetric information. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and Consumer Reports, we examine turnover and repair patterns. We find evidence of adverse selection due to the conditions of the transmission, engine, and, during colder months, air-conditioning; and sorting due to the conditions of the vehicle body and, d...
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作者：Karle, Heiko; Peitz, Martin
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Mannheim
摘要：We address the effect of expectation-based consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in imperfect competition. Consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the moment of purchase. However, some consumers are initially uninformed about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and price distribution, whereas others are perfectly informed all the time. We show that if firms have symmetric costs, a larger share of informed consumers leads to a more...
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作者：Davis, Peter; Schiraldi, Pasquale
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We show FC-MNL is flexible in the sense of Diewert (), thus its parameters can be chosen to match a well-defined class of possible own- and cross-price elasticities of demand. In contrast to models such as Probit and Random Coefficient-MNL models, FC-MNL does not require estimation via simulation; it is fully analytic. Under well-defined and testable parameter restrictions, FC-MNL is shown to be an unexplored member of McFadden's class of Multivariate Extreme Value discrete-choice models. Ther...
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作者：O'Brien, Daniel P.
摘要：This article examines the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the chain store) can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals. Bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits, bargaining weights, and concession costs. If the chain's integration threat is not credible, price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the averag...
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作者：Agastya, Murali; Bag, Parimal Kanti; Chakraborty, Indranil
作者单位：University of Sydney; National University of Singapore
摘要：A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i) the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii) it...
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作者：McDevitt, Ryan C.; Roberts, James W.
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We consider the relationship between market structure and health outcomes in a setting where patients have stark preferences: urology patients disproportionately match with a urologist of the same gender. In the United States, however, fewer than 6% of urologists are women despite women constituting 30% of patients. We explain a portion of this disparity with a model of imperfect competition in which urology groups strategically differentiate themselves by employing female urologists. These st...
