Communication and authority with a partially informed expert

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agastya, Murali; Bag, Parimal Kanti; Chakraborty, Indranil
• 署名单位: University of Sydney; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12047
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 176-197
• 关键词: strategic information-transmission; multidimensional cheap talk; asymmetric information; conflicting interests; optimal delegation; legislative rules; ORGANIZATIONS; MODEL

摘要

A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i) the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii) it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the informed player, (iii) despite players' preferences being arbitrarily close, it is impossible to assert that the receiver prefers delegation over authority or vice versa.