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作者：Gomes, Renato
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A key feature of online markets for advertising (e.g., sponsored links) is that clicking rates depend on the searchers' expectations that the platform selects relevant advertisers. This article studies auction design by a platform that maximizes profits in the long run, where clicking rates are mechanism dependent. In line with the practice of the major search engines, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is a scoring auction that combines the willingness to pay and the relevance to searchers of a...
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作者：Warren, Patrick L.
作者单位：Clemson University
摘要：This article estimates the causal effect of retirement-induced workload spikes on the selection of procurement terms. In a sample of 150,000 contracts from 85 procurement offices over 11 years, increases in workload decrease reliance on competitive acquisition procedures, decrease reliance on firm-fixed-price contracts, increase risk of renegotiation, and increase costs. These estimates are consistent with a model of endogenously incomplete contracting. The US federal government has experience...
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作者：Bajari, Patrick; Dalton, Christina; Hong, Han; Khwaja, Ahmed
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; National Bureau of Economic Research; Wake Forest University; Stanford University; Yale University
摘要：Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care consumption. We propose a two-step semiparametric estimation strategy to identify and estimate a canonical model of asymmetric information in health care markets. With this method, we can estimate a structural model o...
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作者：Chen, Zhijun; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：University of Auckland; University of Rochester; University of East Anglia
摘要：We consider a class of contracts in which buyers commit to giving a seller some minimum share of their total purchases. We show that such contracts can be used by an incumbent seller to reduce the probability of entry by a rival seller when the incumbent can commit to its selling price as part of the contract. We further show that such contracts can be profitable for the incumbent even when exclusive dealing would not be, and even when buyers can coordinate their accept-or-reject decisions. Th...
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作者：Peterson, Jonathan R.; Schneider, Henry S.
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Cornell University
摘要：We analyze adverse selection in the used-car market using a new approach that considers a car as an assemblage of parts, some with symmetric information and others with asymmetric information. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and Consumer Reports, we examine turnover and repair patterns. We find evidence of adverse selection due to the conditions of the transmission, engine, and, during colder months, air-conditioning; and sorting due to the conditions of the vehicle body and, d...
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作者：Epstein, Andrew J.; Ketcham, Jonathan D.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Patients rely on physicians to act as their agents when prescribing medications, yet the efforts of pharmaceutical manufacturers and prescription drug insurers may alter this agency relationship. We evaluate how formularies, and the use of information technology (IT) that provides physicians with formulary information, influence prescribing. We combine data from a randomized experiment of physicians with secondary data to eliminate bias due to patient, physician, drug, and insurance characteri...
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作者：Sekeris, Petros G.
作者单位：University of Portsmouth
摘要：Earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by Folk theorems for dynamic games. In this article, we graft on a standard natural-resource exploitation game the possibility to appropriate the resource through violent means. Because conflict emerges endogenously as resources get depleted, the threat supporting the cooperative outcome is no longer subgame perfect, and thus credible. The unique equilibrium is such that players exploit noncooperatively the resource whe...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Roberts, James W.; Sweeting, Andrew
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first-price auction...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Reisinger, Markus
作者单位：University of Melbourne; WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
摘要：We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete in quantities downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate foreclosure effects, and vertical integration even to full foreclosure can be procompetitive. Interestingly, vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive if the industry is otherwise more concentrated. Ext...
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作者：Ganglmair, Bernhard; Tarantino, Emanuele
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Bologna; Tilburg University
摘要：We analyze the sustainability of a conversation when one agent might be endowed with a piece of private information that affects the payoff distribution to its benefit. Such a secret can compromise the sustainability of conversation. Even without an obligation, the secret holder will disclose its secret if it prevents preemptive termination of the conversation. The nonsecret holder lacks this possibility and stops the conversation. Competition and limited effectiveness of the conversation ampl...
