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作者：Chen, Daniel L.
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：The alienability of legal claims holds the promise of increasing access to justice and fostering development of law. I develop a principal-agent framework where litigation funders provide expertise in reducing uncertainty in agents' disutility of production. The model leads to the counterintuitive prediction that litigation funders prefer cases with novel issues, and social surplus is positively correlated with legal uncertainty. Consistent with the model, court backlog, court expenditures, an...
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作者：Hong, Harrison; Kremer, Ilan; Kubik, Jeffrey D.; Mei, Jianping; Moses, Michael
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Warwick; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Syracuse University
摘要：We estimate the effect of ordering by value on revenues in sequential art auctions held by Sotheby's and Christie's. We exploit a pre determined rotation of which of these two houses holds their auction first during auction week in New York City. When the house that goes first has relatively expensive paintings compared to the other house, we find that the sale premium for the week is around 21% higher relative to the mean sale premium, and the fraction of paintings sold during the week is aro...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Taub, Bart
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick; University of Glasgow
摘要：We characterize a duopoly buffeted by demand and cost shocks. Firms learn about shocks from common observation, private observation, and noisy price signals. Firms internalize how outputs affect a rival's signal, and hence output. We distinguish how the nature of information public versus privateand of what firms learn aboutcommon versus private valuesaffect equilibrium outcomes. Firm outputs weigh private information about private values by more than common values. Thus, prices contain more i...
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作者：Halac, Marina
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Warwick
摘要：A principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent, but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining. I study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment. When investment returns are observable, informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts, as they induce higher investment ex ante: the principal invests not only to generate direct returns, but also to improve relational incentives....
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作者：Lee, Jinhyuk; Seo, Kyoungwon
作者单位：Ulsan National Institute of Science & Technology (UNIST); Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
摘要：This article proposes a computationally fast estimator for random coefficients logit demand models using aggregate data that Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (; hereinafter, BLP) suggest. Our method, which we call approximate BLP (ABLP), is based on a linear approximation of market share functions. The computational advantages of ABLP include (i) the linear approximation enables us to adopt an analytic inversion of the market share equations instead of a numerical inversion that BLP propose, (ii) A...
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作者：Barwick, Panle Jia; Pathak, Parag A.
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This article studies the consequences of fixed commissions and low entry barriers in Greater Boston's real estate brokerage industry from 1998-2007. We find that agent entry reduces average service quality and use a dynamic empirical model to study the inefficiency in the current market structure. To accommodate a large state space, we approximate the value function using sieves and impose the Bellman equation as an equilibrium constraint. Our results suggest that a 50% cut in commissions woul...
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作者：Prendergast, Canice
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Empirical evidence consistently finds that incentive pay is more frequent when authority is delegated to workers than when their superiors hold authority. We provide a model where incentive pay results in the abuse of authority by their superiors, and (under reasonable conditions) implies that (i) incentive pay is higher when an agent holds control rights than when her principal has authority, (ii) effort is less responsive on the margin to incentive pay when the principal holds authority, and...
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作者：Kim, Jin-Hyuk; Wagman, Liad
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Illinois Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a model in which firms offer financial products to individuals, post prices for their products, and screen consumers who apply to purchase them. Any information obtained in the screening process may be traded to another firm selling related products. We show that firms' ability to sell consumer information can lead to lower prices, higher screening intensities, and increased social welfare. By exploiting variations in the adoption of local financial-privacy ordinances in five Californ...
