Implementation by Gradual Revelation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Celik, Gorkem
• 署名单位: ESSEC Business School
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12086
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 271-296
• 关键词: dominant-strategy implementation; asymmetric information; auction design; unitary trials; incentives; PROOF; allocation; mechanisms

摘要

We investigate the feasibility of implementing an allocation rule with a gradual-revelation mechanism in which agents reveal their private information over time (rather than all at once). With independently distributed types, private values, and transferable utilities satisfying a single-crossing property, an ex-post monotonicity condition is sufficient for budget-balanced implementation of any incentive-compatible allocation rule with any gradual-revelation scheme. When we extend the single-crossing property over the set of randomized allocations, a weaker monotonicity condition is necessary and sufficient for budget-balanced implementation by gradual revelation.