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作者：Blanes i Vidal, Jordi; Moeller, Marc
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bern
摘要：We use a mechanism-design approach to study a team whose members select a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade-off between adaptation and motivation. We determine the conditions under which first-best project and effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the team grows in size. We also characterize the second...
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作者：Fox, Jeremy T.; Gandhi, Amit
作者单位：Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We show how to nonparametrically identify the distribution of unobservables, such as random coefficients, that characterizes the heterogeneity among consumers in multinomial choice models. We provide general identification conditions for a class of nonlinear models and then verify these conditions using the primitives of the multinomial choice model. We require that the distribution of unobservables lie in the class of all distributions with finite support, which under our most general assumpt...
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作者：Cabral, Luis; Natividad, Gabriel
作者单位：New York University; Universidad de Piura
摘要：We identify significant cross-selling effects in the home video industry: a 10% increase in the demand for a studio's old titles leads to a 4.7% increase in new title sales. We argue this is due to supply-side effects: studios with strong titles are better able to push other titles through retailers; and the latter push these additional supplies to consumers by means of lower prices and/or heavier advertising. Our strategy for identifying causality is based on star power effects: increases in ...
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作者：Huck, Steffen; Luenser, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for experience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed. Although oligopolies benefit consumers regardless of whether prices are fixed or endogenously chosen, we find that price competition lowers efficiency as consumers pay too little attention to reputation for quality. This provides empirical support to rec...
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作者：Boudreau, Kevin J.; Lakhani, Karim R.; Menietti, Michael
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment. The performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities, precisely conforming to theoretical predictions. Most participants respond negatively, whereas the highest-skilled contestants respond positively. In counterfactual simulations, we interp...
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作者：Imhof, Lorens; Kraekel, Matthias
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced. If, at the outset, one agent is stronger than the other, the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down. Handicaps can in this case restore incentives. In practice, competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths. Then, competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down, but handicaps cannot be used. We sh...
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作者：Mayo, John W.; Sappington, David E. M.
作者单位：Georgetown University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare-maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs. A supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value, because once the input is acquired, it is unavailable to rivals. An unfettered auction often ensures the welfare-maximizing allocation of an input increment. However, it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive ...
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作者：de Corniere, Alexandre; de Nijs, Romain
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：An online platform auctions an advertising slot. Several advertisers compete in the auction, and consumers differ in their preferences. Prior to the auction, the platform decides whether to allow advertisers to access information about consumers (disclosure) or not (privacy). Disclosure improves the match between advertisers and consumers but increases product prices, even without price-discrimination. We provide conditions under which disclosure or privacy is privately and/or socially optimal...
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作者：McCullough, Jeffrey S.; Parente, Stephen T.; Town, Robert
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Health information technology (IT) adoption, it is argued, will dramatically improve patient care. We study the impact of hospital IT adoption on patient outcomes focusing on the role of patient and organizational heterogeneity. We link detailed hospital discharge data on all Medicare fee-for-service admissions from 2002-2007 to detailed hospital-level IT adoption information. For all IT-sensitive conditions, we find that health IT adoption reduces mortality for the most complex patients but d...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Li, Jin; Mukherjee, Arijit
作者单位：Yale University; Northwestern University; Michigan State University
摘要：We study optimal dynamic contracting for a firm with multiple workers where compensation is based on public performance signals and privately reported peer evaluations. We show that if evaluation and effort provision are done by different workers (e.g., consider supervisor-agent hierarchy), first-best can be achieved even in a static setting. However, if each worker both exerts effort and reports peer evaluations (e.g., consider team setting), effort incentives cannot be decoupled from truth-t...
