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作者：Bertoletti, Paolo; Etro, Federico
作者单位：University of Pavia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：We provide a unified approach to imperfect (monopolistic, Bertrand, and Cournot) competition when preferences are symmetric over a finite but endogenous number of goods. Markups depend on the Morishima elasticity of substitution and on the number of varieties. The comparative statics of free-entry equilibria is examined, establishing the conditions for markup neutrality with respect to income, market size, and productivity. We compare endogenous and optimal market structures for several non-CE...
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作者：Han, Lu; Hong, Seung-Hyun
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in-house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in-house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incent...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Varas, Felipe
作者单位：Stanford University; Duke University
摘要：We study disclosure dynamics when the firm value evolves stochastically over time. The presence of litigation risk, arising from the failure to disclose unfavorable information, crowds out positive disclosures. Litigation risk mitigates firms' tendency to use inefficient disclosure policies. From a policy perspective, we show that a stricter legal environment may be an efficient way to stimulate information transmission in capital markets, particularly when the nature of information is proprie...
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作者：Hunold, Matthias; Stahl, Konrad
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：With backward acquisitions in their efficient supplier, downstream firms profitably internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales, while upstream competition is also relaxed. Downstream prices increase with passive, yet decrease with controlling acquisition. Passive acquisition is profitable when controlling acquisition is not. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, thus delegating commitment to the supplier, and with it high input prices, allowing ...
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作者：Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We compare two commonly used mechanisms in public procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a general characterization of both mechanisms based on public scrutiny requirements and showcontrary to conventional wisdomthat an intransparent negotiation always yields higher social surplus than a transparen...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Ciliberto, Federico; Liaukonyte, Jura; Renault, Regis
作者单位：University of Virginia; Cornell University; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We derive equilibrium incentives to use comparative advertising that pushes up own brand perception and pulls down the brand image of targeted rivals. Data on content and spending for all TV advertisements in Over-The- Counter (OTC) analgesics enable us to construct matrices of rival targeting expenditures and estimate the structural model. Using brands' optimal choices, these attack matrices identify diversion ratios, from which we derive comparative advertising damage measures. We find that ...
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作者：Branstetter, Lee; Chatterjee, Chirantan; Higgins, Matthew J.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：This article estimates welfare effects of accelerated generic entry via Paragraph IV challenges. Using data from 2000-2008 for hypertension drugs in the United States, we estimate demand using a random-coefficients logit model. We find consumers gain $42 billion whereas producers lose $32.5 billion from entry. This modest $9.5 billion gain in social welfare is consistent with our observation that overall consumption does not increase after entrygeneric sales displace branded sales, shifting su...
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作者：Dardanoni, Valentino; Li Donni, Paolo
作者单位：University of Palermo
摘要：We consider the welfare loss of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets, which results when private information or regulatory constraints prevent insurance companies to set premiums reflecting expected costs. We propose a methodology which uses survey data to measure this welfare loss. After identifying some types which determine expected risk and insurance demand, we derive the key factors defining the demand and cost functions in each market induced by these unobservable types. These are...
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作者：Grassi, Simona; Ma, Ching-to Albert
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Boston University
摘要：Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts' cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Referral efficiency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expert's cost. How...
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作者：Nishiwaki, Masato
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：Industries with declining demand tend to be riddled with chronic excess capital due to the presence of a business-stealing effect and fixed costs. This article highlights the potential of mergers to internalize this business-stealing effect and thereby promote divestment. Using the case of mergers in the Japanese cement industry, it examines whether such merger-induced divestment improves total welfare based on a dynamic model of divestment. The findings suggest that merged firms indeed tended...
