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作者：Gaudin, Germain
作者单位：IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris
摘要：This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for general forms of demand and retail competition. Market distortions are more severe under secret contracts if and only if retailers' instruments are strategic complements. We also investigate the effect of op...
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作者：Dong, Ailin; Massa, Massimo; Zaldokas, Alminas
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; INSEAD Business School; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：In a cross-country study, we investigate how staggered passage of national leniency programs from 1990-2012 has affected firms' margins and merger activity. We find that these programs, which give amnesty to cartel conspirators that cooperate with antitrust authorities, reduced the gross margins of the affected firms. However, firms reacted to new regulations by engaging in more mergers that had negative effects on downstream firms. Our results imply that although these programs were generally...
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作者：Dafny, Leemore; Ho, Kate; Lee, Robin S.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We consider the effect of mergers between firms whose products are not viewed as direct substitutes for the same good or service, but are bundled by a common intermediary. Focusing on hospital mergers across distinct geographic markets, we show that such combinations can reduce competition among merging hospitals for inclusion in insurers' networks, leading to higher prices (or lower-quality care). Using data on hospital mergers from 1996-2012, we find support that this mechanism operates with...
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作者：Cameron, Charles M.; Kornhauser, Lewis A.; Parameswaran, Giri
作者单位：Princeton University; New York University; Haverford College
摘要：The practice of horizontal stare decisis requires that judges occasionally decide cases incorrectly. What sustains this practice? Given a heterogeneous bench, we show that the increasing differences in dispositional value property of preferences generates gains when judges trade dispositions over the case-space. These gains are fully realized by implementing a compromise rule-stare decisis. Absent commitment, we provide conditions that sustain the compromise in a repeated game. When complete c...
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作者：Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard; Sarpca, Sinan; Sieg, Holger; Zaber, Melanie
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Koc University; University of Pennsylvania; RAND Corporation
摘要：We estimate an equilibrium model of private and state college competition that generates realistic pricing patterns for private colleges using a large national data set from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS). Our analysis distinguishes between tuition variation that reflects efficient pricing to students who generate beneficial peer externalities and variation that reflects arguably inefficient exercise of market power. Our findings indicate substantial exercise of market po...
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作者：Ciliberto, Federico; Moschini, GianCarlo; Perry, Edward D.
作者单位：University of Virginia; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Iowa State University; Kansas State University
摘要：We develop a discrete-choice model of differentiated products for US corn and soybean seed demand to study the welfare impact of genetically engineered (GE) crop varieties. Using a unique data set spanning the period 1996-2011, we find that the welfare impact of the GE innovation is significant. In the last five years of the period analyzed, our preferred counterfactual indicates that total surplus due to GE traits was $5.18 billion per year, with seed manufacturers appropriating 56% of this s...
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作者：An, Yonghong; Tang, Xun
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Rice University
摘要：We investigate contractors' bargaining power and holdup on buyers in procurement auctions of incomplete contracts held by California Department of Transportation. Using a model where contractors bid competitively in response to a buyer's choice of initial contract design, we infer the contractors' costs and bargaining power from the bids and transfers negotiated after the auction. We find that the contract winners have substantial bargaining power in post-auction negotiation. The average holdu...
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作者：Reisinger, Markus; Tarantino, Emanuele
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; University of Mannheim
摘要：Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel tr...
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作者：Chen, Zhijun; Rey, Patrick
作者单位：Monash University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：Cross-subsidization arises naturally when firms with different comparative advantages compete for consumers with heterogeneous shopping patterns. Firms then face a form of co-opetition, as they offer substitutes for one-stop shoppers and complements for multi-stop shoppers. When intense competition for one-stop shoppers drives total prices down to cost, firms subsidize weak products with the profits made on strong products. Moreover, firms have incentives to seek comparative advantages on diff...
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作者：Anh Nguyen; Teck Yong Tan
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Nanyang Technological University
摘要：We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-u...
