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作者：Polanski, Arnold
作者单位：University of East Anglia
摘要：Information goods (or information for short) play an essential role in modern economies. We consider a setup where information has some idiosyncratic value for each consumer, exerts externalities, and can be freely replicated and transmitted in a communication network. Prices paid for information are determined via the (asymmetric) Nash Bargaining Solution with endogenous disagreement points. This decentralized approach leads to unique prices and payoffs in any exogenous network. We use these ...
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作者：Parra, Alvaro
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：I study how patent policy-characterized by patent length and forward protection-affects Research and Development (R&D) dynamics, leadership persistence, and market structure. Firms' R&D investments increase as the patent's expiration date approaches. Through forward protection, followers internalize the leader's replacement effect. In protective systems, this internalization is substantial, reversing Arrow's traditional result: followers invest less than leaders at every moment of the patent's...
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作者：Frandsen, Brigham; Powell, Michael; Rebitzer, James B.
作者单位：Brigham Young University; Northwestern University; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We propose a common-agency model for explaining inefficient contracting in the US healthcare system. Common-agency problems arise when multiple payers seek to motivate a provider to invest in improved care coordination. We highlight the possibility of sticking points, that is, Pareto-dominated equilibria in which payers coordinate around contracts which give weak incentives to the provider. Sticking points rationalize three hard-to-explain features of the US healthcare system: widespread fee-f...
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作者：Suijs, Jeroen; Wielhouwer, Jacco L.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：This article shows that firms voluntarily increase their disclosures in response to the threat of more stringent disclosure regulations. These disclosures are mostly just sufficient to deter regulation. However, when investment risk is low, both managers and investors might strictly prefer the regulation deterring equilibrium. We further find that in many cases, regulation can only be deterred by asymmetric disclosure behavior of the firms. This suggests that coordination issues and free-ridin...
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作者：Neeman, Zvika; Ory, Aniko; Yu, Jungju
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Yale University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study a model of reputation with two long-lived firms who operate under a collective brand or as two individual brands. Firms' investments in quality are unobserved and can only be sustained through reputational concerns. In a collective brand, consumers cannot distinguish between the two firms. In the long run, this generates incentives to free-ride on the other firm's investment, but in the short run, it mitigates the temptation to milk a good reputation. The signal structure and consumer...
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作者：Gu, Dingwei; Yao, Zhiyong; Zhou, Wen; Bai, Rangrang
作者单位：Fudan University; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long-term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two extern...
