Information control in the hold-up problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anh Nguyen; Teck Yong Tan
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University; Nanyang Technological University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12295
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 768-786
• 关键词: investment

摘要

We study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks.