Competitive cross-subsidization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Zhijun; Rey, Patrick
• 署名单位: Monash University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12293
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 645-665
• 关键词: model

摘要

Cross-subsidization arises naturally when firms with different comparative advantages compete for consumers with heterogeneous shopping patterns. Firms then face a form of co-opetition, as they offer substitutes for one-stop shoppers and complements for multi-stop shoppers. When intense competition for one-stop shoppers drives total prices down to cost, firms subsidize weak products with the profits made on strong products. Moreover, firms have incentives to seek comparative advantages on different products. Finally, banning below-cost pricing increases firms' profits at the expense of one-stop shoppers, which calls for a cautious use of below-cost pricing regulations in competitive markets.