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作者：Chan, Lester T.
作者单位：Xiamen University
摘要：Network effects typically generate multiple equilibria in two-sided markets. To overcome the methodological challenge of selecting an appropriate equilibrium, this article shows that many two-sided market models are weighted potential games, and therefore, a refinement of Nash equilibrium justified by many theoretical and experimental studies, potential maximization, pins down an equilibrium. Under potential maximization, platforms often subsidize one side and charge the other, that is, divide...
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作者：Chen, Yuyu; Igami, Mitsuru; Sawada, Masayuki; Xiao, Mo
作者单位：Peking University; Yale University; Hitotsubashi University; University of Arizona
摘要：We study how ownership affects productivity in the context of China's privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Its true impact remains unclear and controversial, partly because the government selectively privatized or liquidated nonperforming SOEs. To address this selection problem, we augment the Gandhi-Navarro-Rivers nonparametric production function to incorporate endogenous ownership changes. Results suggest private firms are 53% more productive than SOEs on average, but the benefi...
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作者：Donna, Javier D.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：I develop a structural model of urban travel to estimate long-run gasoline price elasticities. I model the demand for transportation services using a dynamic discrete-choice model with switching costs and estimate it using a panel dataset with public market-level data on automobile and public transit use in Chicago. Long-run own- (automobile) and cross- (transit) price elasticities are substantially more elastic than short-run elasticities. Elasticity estimates from static and myopic models ar...
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作者：Conlon, Christopher; Mortimer, Julie Holland
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：The diversion ratio for products j and k is the fraction of consumers who leave product j after a price increase and switch to product k. Theoretically, it is expressed as the ratio of demand derivatives from a multi-product firm's Bertrand-Nash first-order condition. In practice, diversion ratios are also measured from second-choice data or customer-switching surveys. We establish a LATE interpretation of diversion ratios, and show how diversion ratios are obtained from different intervention...
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作者：Auster, Sarah; Kos, Nenad; Piccolo, Salvatore
作者单位：University of Bonn; Bocconi University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Bocconi University; University of Bergamo
摘要：A buyer can either buy a good at a local monopolist or search for it in the market. The more intensely the buyer searches, the more likely he will find the good in the market; if his search fails, he can still buy it from the local monopolist. We show that a buyer with a higher willingness to pay searches (weakly) more intensely. This skews the distribution of types buying at the local monopolist toward lower valuations and exerts pressure on the local monopolist to reduce his price. Despite t...
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作者：Llanes, Gaston; Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：We study a platform that signs private contracts with sellers. Contractual secrecy implies interrelated hold-up problems for buyers and sellers that reduce platform profits and welfare. By increasing its control over sellers' prices, the platform is able to increase price transparency and commit to not behaving opportunistically, which increases profits and welfare. Thus, policy prescriptions for dealing with contractual secrecy are reversed in the case of two-sided platforms. We also find a p...
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作者：Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：This article analyzes supply tariffs that discriminate between resale in different markets. In a setting with competing retailers that operate in multiple (independent or interdependent) markets, we show that, all else equal, a monopolist supplier wants to discriminate against resale in the market with the higher aggregate cross-seller diversion ratio. We find that discrimination can improve allocative efficiency and present sufficient conditions, involving the pass-through rates and the marke...
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作者：Bhaskar, V; Roketskiy, Nikita
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial consumption choices cannot be deterministic. Thus, ex post heterogeneity in preferences arises endogenously. Consumer privacy improves social welfare, consumer surplus and the profits of the second-period seller, while reducing the profits of the first period seller, relativ...
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作者：Cao, Guangyu; Jin, Ginger Zhe; Weng, Xi; Zhou, Li-An
作者单位：Peking University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Using staggered entry of two dockless bike-sharing firms, we study whether the entrant expands or steals the market from the incumbent in 59 cities. Compared with 23 cities without entry, the entry helps the incumbent to serve more trips, make more bike investment, achieve higher revenue per trip, improve bike utilization, and form a wider and more dispersed network. The market-expanding effect on new users dominates a significant market-stealing effect on old users. These findings, plus a the...
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作者：Hester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; University of Munich; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education, and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers' productivities. Audits are costly and non-contractible. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our results feature new auditing pat...
