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作者：Cheng, Chen
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This article studies moral hazard in teams where workers' wages depend on two types of performance measures: objective team output and subjective evaluations. The evaluations include both self- and peer evaluations. I find that when evaluations become less subjective, workers' wages should be more sensitive not only to their evaluations but also to the team's output. I also show that subjective evaluations should be used in relative terms only when the degree of subjectivity is not too high. T...
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作者：Aghamolla, Cyrus; Corona, Carlos; Zheng, Ronghuo
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high-performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find...
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作者：Macher, Jeffrey T.; Miller, Nathan H.; Osborne, Matthew
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga
摘要：We examine the adoption of fuel-efficient precalciner kilns in the cement industry using the universe of adoption decisions in the United States over 1973-2013. We find that cement plants are more likely to adopt the technology if fuel costs are high, nearby competitors are few, and local demand conditions are favorable. We relate the findings to the Schumpeterian and induced innovation hypotheses regarding the effects of competition and factor prices. Our results suggest firms may be most res...
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作者：Archsmith, J.; Gillingham, K. T.; Knittel, C. R.; Rapson, D. S.
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作者：Chakraborty, Indranil; Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce the ...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. Regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payoff shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade). By contrast, price volatility is always lower than the...
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作者：Craig, Stuart V.; Grennan, Matthew; Swanson, Ashley
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Columbia University
摘要：We estimate the effects of hospital mergers, using detailed data containing medical supply transactions (representing 23% of operating costs) from a sample of US hospitals, 2009-2015. Pre-merger price variation across hospitals (Gini coefficient 7%) suggests significant opportunities for cost decreases. However, we observe limited evidence of actual savings. In this retrospective study, targets realized 1.9% savings; acquirers realized no significant savings. Examining treatment effect heterog...
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Li, Jianpei; Schwartz, Marius
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of International Business & Economics; Georgetown University
摘要：We analyze welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service, and establish general demand conditions for differential pricing by symmetric firms to increase consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals why competitive differential pricing is generally beneficial-more than price discrimination-but not always, including why profit may fall, unlike for monopoly. The presence of more competitors tends to enlarge consume...
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作者：Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private information about their cost of effort, and they exert unobservable effort. The optimal contract menu pairs a higher probability of assignment to a valuable project with a lower bonus in case of success. ...
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作者：Mitchell, Matthew
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Consumers rely on intermediaries (influencers) such as social media recommendations to provide information about products. The advice may be mixed with endorsement in a way that is unobservable to the follower, creating a trade-off for influencers between the best advice and the most revenue. This article models the dynamic relationship between an influencer and a follower. The relationship evolves between periods of less and more revenue. The model can provide insight into policies such as th...
